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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD
KENNETH S. CARLSTON*
Arbitration is distinctly not a judicial process under our system of law.
Arbitration contracts rely upon statute law for their enforceability,' arbitra-
tors do not sit as judges of the law, 2 and arbitral awards depend upon the
courts for their enforceability.3 The losing party in an arbitration has an
imposing array of legal weapons upon which he may rely to justify a failure
to carry out the award.4 Though the process of arbitration has proved its
usefulness, the source of its strength has been in the efficiency of its function-
ing rather than in its legal quality. Indeed,,its extra-judicial character is
considered to be a vital source of its strength. 5
Yet the process of arbitration was at one time considered to have
judicial quality. Samuel Johnson, in his famed Dictionary, defines "arbitra-
tion" as "the determination of a cause by a judge mutually agreed on by
the parties." "To arbitrate" is "to decide" or "to judge of" or "to give
judgment." An arbitrator" is "an extraordinary judge between party and
party, chosen by their mutual consent."' Webster, in 1841, finds that "to
arbitrate" means "to decide" or "to judge of."17 Today Webster defines
"arbitration" as "the hearing and determination of a cause between parties
in controversy by a person or persons chosen by the parties, or appointed
under statutory authority, instead of by a judicial tribunal provided by
law."" And Bouvier today defines "arbitration" as "the investigation and
determination of a matter or matters of difference between contending
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. The rule of revocability of arbitration agreements appears to stem from
Lord Coke's decision in Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 81b (1609).
2. Byrd v. Odem, 9 Ala. 755, 766 (1846); White Mountains R. R. v. Beane,
39 N. H. 107, 108 (1859) ("their award will not be set aside, however different
the decision upon the law may be from the opinions entertained by the court").
3. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs 674-681 (1930).
4. E.g., nearly two printed pages of items appear under the title "Causes to
Impeach Awards" in the Index to STURGES, id. at 1040-1041.
5. KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 4 (1941).
6. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768), italics sup-plied. 7. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 94 (1st
ed. 1841), italics supplied.
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parties, by one or more unofficial persons, chosen by the parties, and called
arbitrators, or referees."9
International arbitration, however, in the words of John Bassett Moore,
is "judicial;" its object is "to displace war between nations as a means of
obtaining. redress, by the judgments of international judicial tribunals."' 0
The writer has elsewhere endeavored to demonstrate that "international
arbitration is a judicial process, involving the settlement of disputes between
States by tribunals acting as courts of law."
11
It 'is this judicial quality of the international tribunal that is one of the
greatest sources of its strength. Law governs its creation, its functioning
and the binding force of its judgments. A creature of contract, and thus
responsive to the *will of the parties, it still remains a court of law and
subject to judicial standards.
Unlike a domestic arbitration agreement,' 2 an arbitration treaty may
not, under international law, be revoked by the unilateral act of one of
the parties.' 3 Unlike a domestic arbitration tribunal, 4 an international
tribunal has plenary power to determine its own jurisdiction subject to n'o
superior judicial body;' 5 though its decisions outside the scope of its juris-
diction are without legal effect and are not binding on the parties.10 A
party's participation in a domestic arbitration proceeding, even if continued
until the rendering of the award, will not preclude it from thereafter con-
testing the validity of the submission agreement. Not so in an international
9. 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 225 (8th ed. 1914).
10. 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1069 (1906), italics supplied.
11. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION Vi, (1946),
italics supplied.
12. "The common law cases in both courts of law and courts of equity are
nearly uniform in holding that agreements of submission, like agreements to arbitrate
future disputes, are revocable." STURGES, op. cit. r upra note 3 at 237-238; however,
under numerous state statutes and the U. S. Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1940),
no unilateral revocation of the arbitration agreement is allowed.'
13. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 745 (4th ed. 1928).
14. It is for the courts to determine whether arbitratols confine themselves
in their award to the scope of the submission. Squires v. Anderson, 54 Mo. 193,
197 (1873); Boston Water Power Co. v. Gray, 47 Mass. (6 Metc.) 131 (1843).
15. Advisory Opinion No. 16 (August 28, 1928), PERMANENT COURT OF INTER-
NATIONAL JUSTICE, SER. B, 20; 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10 at 33-35.
16. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 420 (8th ed. 1924); Morelli,
La Thgorie G~nrale du, Procds Internationai, 61 RECUEIL DES COvRs 327, 329-330
(1937).17. Under all arbitration laws, except the New York Arbitration Law, in-
validity of the arbitration agreement may be raised by the parties after the award
is made. KELLOR, op. cit. supra note 5 at 171, n. 7; see, however, N. Y. Arbitration
Law § 1458, permitting such attack in certain qualified circumstances after notice.
2
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arbitration. In the opinion of Judge Moore, it is "inconceivable that a
state should be permitted silently to hold in reserve the question of the
validity or continuing force of its own agreement, until it should. have
learned, by the results of the agreement's complete execution, whether it
would be advantageous or disadvantageous to raise the question."' Failures
by an international tribunal to observe a stipulated course of procedure
must also be promptly objected to; otherwise silence will be deemed to be
waiver or tacit ratification. 9 A domestic arbitration award need not be
reasoned,20 the award of an international tribunal must be.21 Of salient
importance is the fact that the award of an international tribunal does not
need, as does a domestic arbitration award,22 a court order to render it
enforceable, but is itself binding upon the parties.23 In the words of Article
81 of the Hague Convention of 1907, "the award, duly pronounced and
notified to the agents of the parties, settles the dispute definitively and with-
out appeal.' ' 24 Failure by the losing party to carry out an award justifies
resort to sanctions. 25 It is, 'moreover, clear that the parties are entitled,
among other things, to due deliberation by a tribunal duly constituted and
free from corruption in the broadest sense of that term. They are entitled
to a judgment uninfluenced by fraud. 26 Thus contrasted with the correspond-
ing rules governing a domestic arbitration proceeding, the legal strength
and judicial quality of an international arbitration proceeding emerges.
There is an international common law upon which states may safely rely
when they submit their disputes to arbitration. In entering upon an arbitra-
18. 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT-MOORE 129 (1944).
19. "Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia" (Apr. 26, 1928) PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, SER. A. No. 15, at 25; BALASKO, CAUSES DE NULLITE
DE LA SENTENCE ARBITRALE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 107-108, 142 (1938).
20. In re Curtis and Castle Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501, 513 (1894); McKnight
v. McCullough, 21 Ia. 111 (1866); Fraenkel, Procedural Aspects of Arbitration, 83
U. OF PA. L. REv. 226, 240 (1934). Kellor declares that "it is scarcely ever bene-
ficial and it is rarely expedient for arbitrators to explain the process of reasoning or
the method by which they have reacled their decision." KELLOR, op. Ci. supra
note 5 at 115.
21. See the collection of authorities and precedents in CARLSTON, op. Ci. supra
note 11 at 50-53.
22. Supra note 3.
23. WITENBERG, L'ORGANISATION, LA PROCEDURE ET LA SENTENCE INTER-
NATIONALES 352-353 (1937); Limburg, L'A-toritg de Chose agie des D~cisons des
Jurisdictions Internationales, 30 RECUEIL DES CouRs 523, 566 (1929).
24. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, CONFERENCE OF 1907,
605 (Carnegie trans., 1920).
25. Dumas, Sanctions of International Arbitration, 5 Am. J. INT'L LAw 941,
955-957 (1911); DUMAS, LES SANCrIONS DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL (1905).
26. See CARLSTON, op. cit. supra note 11, §§ 11, 16 and 18.
1948]
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tion, they are assured that the commands of their compromis will be
respected, that the tribunal will observe the minimum procedural standards
observed by courts of law generally, and that the judgment of the tribunal
will be confined to the controversy submitted to it and will respect the law
imposed upon the tribunal. With these guarantees of justice existing in the
proceess of international arbitration, states have often resorted to it for
settlement of their disputes.
Arbitration has been peculiarly effective in liquidating international
claims, such as claims of a state on behalf of its nationals based on denial
of justice by respondent state. Cases in this field, known as that of the
responsibility of states, have probably occupied the largest volume of
litigation before international tribunals; there are literally thousands of
such decisions. A number of diplomatic episodes of importance have been
decided by arbitration; it has so happened that the Permanent Court of
Arbitration provided for under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
has disposed of a number of such cases. Boundary disputes, many with a
stormy diplomatic history, have also been frequently resolved by arbitra-
tion. The Central American and South American states can be proud of
their record here; numerous and sensitive boundary controversies have
been submitted by them to arbitration. Yet the process of international
arbitration has not achieved the ultimate object to which John Bassett
Moore looked forward--"to displace war between nations."
International arbitration in the postwar world will assuredly continue
to perform its task of alleviating lesser controversies among nations. War
damage claims have often in the past been disposed of by the process of
international arbitration. There is evidence that this process is being
resorted to today in the settlement of damage claims arising out of World
War 11.27 Of more significance, arbitration has been accepted as a means
for the settlement of disputes arising out of the peace treaties with the
satellite states of the European Axis countries. 28 It is to be hoped that its
use in the peace settlements will not stop here.
The new international agencies are finding the value of arbitration in
settling internal disputes within their organization. 29
27. Cahn, Arbitration of War Claims, 2 ARB. J. 234 (1947).
28. See Domke, Settlement-of-Disputes Provisions in Axis Satellite Peace
Treaties, 41 AM. J. INT'L LAW 911 (1947).
29. Domke, The Settlement of Disputes in International Agencies, 1 ARB. J.
145 (1946).
4
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Arbitration will also from time to time be utilized to dispose of various
other conflicts in the international sphere. There is hope, for example, that
a certain Central American boundary dispute will be finally resolved by
arbitration.
Claims of governments on behalf of their citizens based on the delicts
ef foreign states will continue to occupy a large part of the judicial business
of international tribunals. It would be a great stride forward in the develop-
ment of international law if cases involving the responsibility of states
would cease to be looked at from the point of view of the obligations of
states and instead be viewed from the standpoint of the rigkts of individuals.
The fundamental interest of all peoples in the establishment of a basic
charter of human rights would then be brought to the fore, instead of the
alleged interest of imperialistic nations in protecting their nationals in back-
ward territories, which has been a major criticism against the doctrine of
the responsibility of states. Instead of a law for the few, for the strong, the
law of the responsibility of states would thus become a shelter for the weak
and the oppressed of all nations. An international court of human relations,
such as Australia proposed in the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights,30 would go far in protecting persons of all countries against violations
of their individual liberties. 31
An International Trade Tribunal, such as has been proposed in the
American Bar Association, 2 would furnish a valuable stimulus to the
development of international trade in assuring speedy protection of treaty
rights to those engaged in foreign trade.
On a wider front, an International Judicial System, with International
Circuit Courts sitting in regular terms in the capital of each member state,
has also been proposed by the American Bar Association. This would
assure existing, accessible and convenient facilities for the final resolution
of controversy.
Others look beyond these specific tasks for the arbitration process and
find in it a means f6r the solution of all international conflict. Hans Kelsen,
30. U. N. Doc. E/CN..4/SR. 16, 6 Feb. 1947.
31. See Cowles, International Arbitration and Human Rights, 1 ARB. J. 272
(1946); Borchard, Historical Background of International Protection of Human
Rights, 243 ANNALS 112 (1946); LAUTERPAcHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN (1945).
32. 71 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 320 (1946); see Domke,
The International Trade Organization Settlement of Disputes-Provisions of the
Draft Charter, 2 Aim. J. 222 at 228 (1947).
33. 69 id. 165, 169, see also 373, 378-379.
1948]
5
Carlston: Carlston: International Arbitration in Postwar
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
for example, advocates "an international court endowed with compulsory
jurisdiction" to which states would be obliged "to submit all their disputes
without exception." 34 Professor Lauterpacht contends that the principles
evolved by our legal systems are of a maturity and breadth which would
make it possible for all conflicts between states to be decided on a basis of
law, even in areas in which positive international law has not as yet developed
rules.35
I On the other hand, Hans Morgenthau, in his brilliant and provocative
chapter, "The Science of Peace," in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, points
out that it is fallacious to assume that internatibnal law and international
arbitration can be relied upon to settle basic conflicts of power in the
international sphere, such as that of Ethiopia in 1935, the Sudetenland in
1938 and Danzig in 1939. He declares that "what is at stake in conflicts of
this kind is not who is right and who is wrong but what ought to be done
in order to combine the particular interests of individual nations with the
general interest in peace and order. The question to be answered is not
what the law is but what it ought to be, and this question cannot be answered
by the lawyer but only by the statesman."36
Elsewhere in the same volume a fundamental fallacy in our approach
to the problems of international relations is said to be that of the "'method
of the single cause.' ,,3 Tolstoy, in his essay on causation in War and Peace,
describes the fallacy of "the single cause" in these words: 8
"The combination of causes is beyond the grasp of the human
intellect. But the impulse to seek causes is innate in the soul of
man. And the human intellect, with no inkling of the immense
variety and complexity of circumstances conditioning a phenom-
enon, any one of which may be separately conceived as the cause
of it, snatches at the first and most easily understod approximation,
and says here is the cause."
If this statement be taken as a major premise, we may find in Morgen-
thau the following minor premise and conclusion:
"The age is forever searching for the philosopher's stone, the
magic formula, which, mechanically applied, will produce the de-
34. KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 14 (1944).
35. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1933). 1
36. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN vs. PowER PoLITIcs 120 (1946).
37. Id. at 95.
38. 3 TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 208 (Gamett translation, London, 1904).
(Vol. 13
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sired result and thus substitute for the uncertainties and risks of
political action the certitude of rational calculation. Since, however,
what the seekers after the magic formula want is simple, rational,
mechanical, and what they have to deal with is complicated, irra-
tional, incalculable, they are compelled, in order to present at least
the semblance of scientific solutions, to simplify the reality of
international' politics and to develop what one might call the
'method of the single cause.'
"The abolition of war is obviously the fundamental problem
confronting international thought. What makes a solution of this
problem *so difficult for the nonrationalist mind is the variety of
causes which have their roots in the innermost aspirations of the
human soul. Were it possible to reduce all those multiple causes
to a single one capable of rational formulation, the solution of the
problem of war and peace would no longer seem to be impossible.39
-In short, the problem of war and peace, being a problem of multiple
causation, can never be solved by the technique of isolating the "single
cause."
When the issue is thus crystallized, however, the asserted universality
of the phenomenon of a restless search for the "single cause" may be
questioned. Sometimes one may be tempted to believe that man, in the
exercise of his reason, is as blind in his efforts to adapt himself to con-
vulsive changes in his environment as are the simpler forms of animal
life in their reliance upon instinct. But the simple psychological mechanism
of trial and error, coupled with the intellectual resources of man, has in
the course of history developed a national and international institutional
life of infinite complexity. The shattering effects upon this institutional life
of the blows of two World Wars have, if nothing else, made evident that
interdependency of the various phases of this institutional life. At the
same time, man's efforts to restore and preserve his ways of life have
exhibited a variety of method and form that belie the asserted tendency to
reduce events to a "single cause" and to prescribe as -a consequence a
"single remedy."
Out of bitter experience and disillusion a greater maturity and wisdom
is being born. The circumstance that the greatest war in modern history
ended on a note of abstraction,'"V-E Day" and "V-J Day," rather than on
the plane of moral fervor attendant, in this country at least, upon the winning
39. MORGENTHAU, op. cit. st pra note 36 at 95.
1948]
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of the preceding World War I, is not without significance. Though the plea
may be made that "the worst settlement of international disputes by adjudi-
cation or arbitration is likely to be less disastrous to the loser and certainly
less destructive to the world than no way of settlement except war,"40 its
hearers now realize that the demonstrable truth of statements of this nature
has not prevented war in the past and will not be likely to prevent it in the
future. For even though the fact of the outbreak of war may be completely
irrational, the prediction of that fact may be rationally demonstrable. The
formulas of an earlier day, the League, the neat mechanisms of Locarno4i
and the General Act,42 are now viewed with skepticism. One of our leading
political scientists recently confessed:
"I think probably one of the greatest indictments of our
attitude in teaching in the last twenty years has been to write off
glibly the institution of war and to write off the books the influence
of power politics. I think political scientists made a great mistake
in doing so. We should be the very ones who are studying power
politics and its implications and the situations growing out of it,
and we should be the ones who study the institution of war."'43
Morgenthau's own volume is but evidence of our awakening to the
"immense variety and complexity of circumstances" conditioning the phe-
nomenon of war. Wright's profound Study of War"4 reveals something of
the vast forces which must be understood and controlled if the problem of
war is ever to be solved. For peace is not static, it is dynamic; it is a
nexus of many forces which are constantly shifting and which demand
constant effort to preserve their equilibrium. There is a technology of
peace as well as a technology of war. The successful waging of war on the
technological front demands primarily the skills and knowledge of the
physical sciences. The successful waging of peace demands the skills and
knowledge of the economist, the political scientist, the lawyer, the psychol-
ogist, the geographer, the publicist, even the military scientist, to mention
but a few.
40. Jackson, Address, PROc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 18 (1945).
41. 54 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 315 (1926).
42. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
Geneva, Sept. 26, 1928. 93 id. 343 (1928).
43. PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF TEACHERS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND RELATED SUBJECTS 66 (1946).
44. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR (1942); see also Wright, Accomplishments and
Expectations of World Organization, 55 YALE L. J. 870 (1946).
8
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The interdependence of economic'well-being and political security are
seen. Thus the authors of a recent study of the problems of Rebuilding the
World Economy conclude that economic rehabilitation is indissolubly linked
with the restoration of political security. They point out that "the need for
economic rehabilitation, though pressing, is only a temporary obstacle to
the [multilateral trading] system's re-establishment. A more basic obstacle
by far is the sense of political tension and insecurity that continues to
pervade large areas of the world. . . . For under conditions of political
insecurity, either internal or external, accompanied as they Are by the
imminent fear of loss through war destruction, invasion or confiscation,
the motivations that operate in a free economy do not lead to -long-term
production investment designed to increase output and to raise standards
of living." 45 A Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey borne out of the
fear of war leads to a Marshall Plan directed solely to the economic recon-
struction of Western Europe. A Marshall Plan in turn ushers in Bevin's
proposal for a "western union" of European countries.46 And as progress
is made toward the economic reconstruction of Western Europe, the linking
of its economy and our own with that of Asia will come to the fore and a
program for the rehabilitation of Asia will doubtless be proposed.
International law as an instrument for the control of relations between
states is today approached realistically with a more scientific appreciation
of its limitations as well as its possibilities. The gaps or lacunae in interna-
tional law, such as the lack of any substantial body of rules governing the
economic aspects of relations between states, for which it has been condemn-
ed,47 are seen to be but reflections of the insistence of states that these areas
of international life shall be subject to sovereign, not international, regula-
tion. As Brierly aptlj says, "international law has hitherto been in the
main a laisser-faire system, having as its chief function to demarcate the
spheres within which each sovereign state is to be free to exercise its domestic
jurisdiction without any legal obligation to defer to the interests of any
other state. '"48 In international law, as in any system of law, the strength
45. BUCHANAN AND LuTz, REBUILDING THE WORLD ECONOMY 299 (1947).
46. N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1948, p. 1, col. 8.
47. Dickinson, International Law: An Inventory, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 506
(1945). Kelsen denies the existence of gaps in the international legal order on the
dialectical ground that the legal order may privilege as well as require action, i.e.,
that there are permissive as well as obligatory norms of conduct. KELSEN, LAW AZJD
PEACE 164 (1942).
48. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1944).
1948]
9
Carlston: Carlston: International Arbitration in Postwar
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of the law lies in its acceptance by those under its governance as well as
the strength of its sanctions.49 Holmes' classic statement is again apposite:
"the life of the law has not been -logic; it has been experience." In a law
based on custom and consent, as is international law, it is self-evident that
its scope and content is moulded by those who are both its creators and its
subjects.
We may create an elaborate hierarchy of international tribunals, we
may multiply their number and refine their procedure, and find that the
reign of law still eludes us. The new International Court of Justice has
until recently been without any judicial business, and even now it has before
it only the Albanian-British controversy concerning the mining of the Corfu
Channel. Resolutions of the Assembly of the United Nations drawing
attention to the availability of the International Court of Justice and
recommending the submission to it of' "legal disputes" will be relatively
ineffective in influencing the course of national policy in resorting to judicial
methods for the solution of controversy.50 Not even the wider adoption of
the compulsory jurisdiction clause will transform the International Court of
Justice into the paramount international body and establish a universal
reign of law if its jurisdiction is not invoked by plantiff states.
International arbitration thus becomes one of many instruments to be
utilized in the struggle for peace. It must be approached with an aware-
ness of its limitations as well as its strength. The work of refining its
technique and usefulness should not be dropped, in a spirit of disillusion,
but should rather be pressed with greater vigor and broader wisdom. On
every front effort should be made to create an environment which will be
favorable to its adoption and growth. The loss of the illusion of an earlier
day that international arbitration will become a royal avenue to world peace
is at the gain of an understanding of its role in the conduct of international
affairs which will far better serve the cause of world peace.
49. Cf. VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 181-194, 243-246 (1944).
50. 3 UNITED NATIONS WEEKLY BULLETIN 787 (1947); see Sohn, "Drumming
Up Business" for the World Court, 33 A. B. A. J. 1224 (1947).
[Vol. 13
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